Understanding the transaction costs of transition: it's the culture, stupid. by Steve Pejovich







































Published in The Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 16, no. 4, 2003, pp. 347-361  
UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF 
TRANSITION: IT’S THE CULTURE, STUPID
∗ 
 
Svetozar (Steve) Pejovich 
Professor Emeritus of Economics 







In the early 1990s, Central and Eastern Europe countires (C&EE) began transition into 
free-market, private-property economies. Thirteen years later, the Index of Economic 
Freedom published annually by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal 
lists only one country in the region as a free market country, seven countries are listed 
as mostly free, nine as mostly unfree, and two as repressive. The same initial objectives 
of transition have clearly produced different results in C&EE. 
The paper argues that observed differences in the results of institutional 
restructuring in C&EE are not accidental. It attributes those differences to the 
interaction between the formal institutions of capitalism and the prevailing cultures in 
dormer socialist states. The “interaction thesis” is summarized as follows: When 
changes in formal rules are in harmony with the prevailing informal rules, he incentives 
they create will tend to reduce transaction costs and free some resources for the 
production of wealth. When new formal rules conflict with the prevailing informal 
rules, the incentives they create will raise transaction costs and reduce the production of 
wealth in the community. 
The Interaction thesis suggests that better understanding of the results of 
transition in C&EE requires analysis of the following three issues: What are the most 
important formal institutions of capitalism? What kind of culture is in harmony with 
formal institutions of capitalism? What is the difference between that culture and 
informal rules in C&EE countries? The paper analyzes those three issues in some detail.  
The findings are that the transaction costs of transition are higher the farther east 
and southeast one travels. Finally, the paper provides several empirical examples in 
support of the interaction thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE INTERACTION THESIS
* 
 
Scholarly research and empirical evidence showing the strong positive relationship 
between the free-market, private-property economy and economic growth is quite 
convincing. For example, Haan and Sturm find that greater economic freedom 
correlates with higher economic growth.
1  Torstensson demonstrates that unstable 
private property rights retard economic growth.
2 North and Weingast argue that the 
development of credible private property rights, the adoption of common law, and non-
enforcement of wage and price controls explain economic growth in Seventeenth-
Century England.
3 Economic studies covering eight countries on four continents show 
the power of property rights to explain and predict economic behavior over a range of 
cultures.
4 The Heritage Foundation’ Index of Economic Freedom and Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom of the World illuminate a strong positive relationship between 
economic freedom and growth.
5 
In the early 1990s, the end of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter C&EE) 
created incentives to seek growth oriented institutional reforms. Responding to those 
incentives, the former socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter C&EE) 
began transition into free-market, private property economies.
6 Thirteen years later, the 
2003 Index of Economic Freedom classified only Estonia as a free-market country.
7 
Seven other countries from the region were classified as mostly free, nine as mostly 
                                                 
*I am grateful to Armen Alchian, Frederic Fransen, Robert Higgs, Milic Milovanovich, Stefan Voigt and 
Fred Witthans for very constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. My long discussions 
with Veselin Vukotich have enriched my understanding of the process of Transition in Eastern Europe. 
 
1Haan, J., and Sturm, J. (2000), “On the Relationship between Economic Freedom and Economic 
Growth,” European Journal of Political Economy 16, pp. 215-241.  
2Torstensson, J. (1994), “Property Rights and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study,” Kyklos 47, pp. 
231-247. 
3North, D. and Weingast, B. (1989), “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions 
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” Journal of Economic History, 49, pp. 803-
832. 
4Pejovich, S. (2001), The Economics of Property Rights, Edward Elgar, volume 2, part IV. 
5 Both indexes are published annually. 
6 I have here used the terms capitalism and free-market, private-property economy interchangeably. 
7To measure economic freedom in any country, the Index uses the following ten factors: trade policy, 
fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flow and foreign investments, banking 
and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulations, and black market activity. Thus, free-market 
economies and economic freedom go hand in hand.  
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unfree, and two as repressive.
8 The same initial objectives of transition have clearly 
produced different results in different C&EE countries. I conjecture that differences in 
the results of transition are not accidental. 
 
The process of transition from socialism to free-market, private-property economies 
calls for the development of new institutions. The transaction costs of institutional 
restructuring must then affect the results of transition. To understand differences in the 
observed results of transition it is necessary to inquire whether the transaction costs of 
institutional restructuring differ from one country to another, and if so, why so?  
There is no generally accepted definition of transaction costs. The paper defines 
transaction costs as the costs of all resources required for making an exchange (e.g., 
discovering exchange opportunities, negotiating exchange, monitoring, and enforcement), 
and for developing, maintaining, and protecting the institutional structure (e.g., judiciary, 
police, and armed forces). This definition offers a conceptually useful perception of 
transaction costs, and is also consistent with the only major attempt to quantify them.
9 
 
A major function of institutions or the rules of the game is to lower transaction costs of 
human interactions.
10 Since the behavior of individuals is rule-guided, the choice of new 
institutions and the method of choosing them must have strong influence on the results 
of transition.  
 
My starting point is that the process of transition in C&EE from socialism to capitalism 
is a cultural issue rather than a mere technical one.
11 To support that proposition, 
economic analysis must explain why and how informal rules affect the results of 
transition.   
 
                                                 
8In the order of their respective ranking, mostly free countries are Lithuania, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Mostly unfree states are Macedonia, Albania, Moldova, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, the Ukraine and Bosnia. Yugoslavia and Belarus are repressive 
states. 
9 Wallis, J. and North, D.  (1986), “Measuring the Transaction Sector in the United States Economy, 
1870-1970,” (S. Engerman and R. Gallman, eds.) Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth, 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 95-161. 
10 I have here used institutions and the rules of the game interchangeably. 
11 See Colombatto, E. (2001), “Development and Transition,” Journal of Markets and Morality, 4, p. 285.   
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While there is no generally accepted definition of culture,
12 the paper goes along with 
scholars who view culture as the informal constraints on human interactions.
13 The 
prevailing culture in the community is then a synthesis of the community’s traditions, 
customs, moral values, religious beliefs, and all other norms of behavior that have 
passed the test of time and bind the generations. The enforcement of informal rules 
takes place by means of sanctions such as expulsion from the community, ostracism by 
friends and neighbors, or loss of reputation.  
 
The term prevailing culture requires a brief explanation. No community is culturally 
homogenous. There are always some individuals who seem to ignore the margin of 
accepted behavior. In some cases those individuals are social innovators or pathfinders. 
In some other cases they are criminals or bums. Sometimes they are both. For example, 
the settlers came to North America in the early days of the new frontiers because they 
opposed the established order, medieval traditions, and taxes imposed by secular and 
religious rulers. By the-then prevailing rules in Europe many settlers were criminals 
because they wanted to make their own choices, develop their own rules of the game, 
and choose their own morals. Also, there are people in most communities who want to 
impose the old ethos, as they subjectively perceive it, on their fellow citizens. Yet, all 
communities have their  “mainstream” rules of the game. Those rules are the result of 
selective evolution. And they maintain themselves by incremental adaptation to changes 
in the social and economic conditions of life. The term prevailing culture refers to those 
informal rules.  
 
Transition means institutional restructuring. The rules of the game consist of formal and 
informal institutions. Since informal rules are not a policy variable, transition has to 
mean the enactment of new formal rules; that is, constitutions, statutes, common law 
                                                 
12 For example, Ruttan has an appendix listing different definitions of culture. See Ruttan, V. (1988), 
“Cultural Endowments and Economic Development: What Can We Learn from Anthropology?” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36, No. 3. 
13See North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 37. Gellner defined culture as “a distinct way of doing things which characterizes a 
given community.” See Gellner, E. (1988), Plough, Book and Sword, London: Collins Harvill, p. 14.  
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precedents, and/or governmental regulations.
14 The results of transition then depend on 
the interaction of new formal and prevailing informal rules.  
 
Of course, the rules do not interact. Individuals do. New formal rules create new 
incentives and opportunities for human interactions. How individuals react to those new 
opportunities for exchange depends on how they perceive them.  And how individuals 
perceive new opportunities depends on their subjective perceptions of reality, which is 
shaped by prevailing culture. Assuming the freedom of choice, their reaction can take 
three basic forms.  
 
If informal rules were not in tune with new formal rules the resulting conflict between 
them would raise the transaction costs of institutional restructuring. For example, the 
leadership of the European Union wants to harmonize a number of formal rules because 
they differ from one member country to another. I conjecture that the rising strength of 
conservative political parties favoring the old formal rules is evidence that the 
“harmonization” of laws from Brussels is not in tune with informal rules in member 
countries.  
 
Transaction costs are reduced when informal rules either ignore formal rules or render 
them neutral. The rise of ethnic and religious ghettos in many American cities reflected 
a strong preference of various ethnic and religious groups—all of them accepting the 
laws of the United States-- to stay together with those individuals whose behavior they 
could understand and predict. Moreover, Ellickson has shown how the residents in 
Shasta County set formal rules aside by choosing to rely on a set of endogenous 
informal rules to resolve disputes arising from damage done by livestock.
15  
 
Finally, harmony between formal and informal rules reduces the transaction costs of 
maintaining the institutional structure in the community. A number of scholars have 
demonstrated how the transaction costs of the development of private property rights in 
                                                 
14Government enforces formal rules by means of sanctions such as fines, imprisonment, and execution. 
15Ellickson, R. (1986), “Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County,” 
Stanford Law Review 38, pp. 624-687.  
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the American West were reduced by the state passing formal rules that in effect 
institutionalized already established informal rules.
16  
 
The relationship between new formal and prevailing informal rules, the interaction thesis, 
can be then summarized as follows: 
When changes in formal rules are in harmony with the prevailing informal rules, 
the incentives they create will tend to reduce transaction costs and free some 
resources for the production of wealth. When new formal rules conflict with the 
prevailing informal rules, the incentive they create will raise transaction costs and 
reduce the production of wealth in the community. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the interaction between the formal 
institutions of capitalism and the prevailing culture in former socialist states might be a 
major reason for uneven results of institutional restructuring in C&EE. To that end, I 
analyze the implications of the interaction between formal and informal rules, the 
differences between the free-market, private-property economy and the prevailing 
culture in C&EE, the process by which the transaction costs of transition could be 
reduced, and the factors upon which that process depends.  
 
                                                 
16For example, see Anderson, T. and Hill, P. (1983), “Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement,” 
Southern Economic Journal 50, pp. 438-450.  
  6
THE CULTURE OF INDIVIDUALISM AND THE FREE-MARKET, PRIVATE-
PROPERTY ECONOMY 
 
The interaction thesis raises three important issues relevant for analysis of the results of 
transition from socialism to free-market, private-property economies (i.e., capitalism). 
Those issues are: (1) What are the most important formal institutions of capitalism; (2) 
What kind of culture is in harmony with formal institutions of capitalism; and (3) What 
is the difference between that culture and informal rules in C&EE countries.  
 
The most important formal rules that set capitalism apart from other systems are 
credible and stable private property rights,
17 the freedom of contracts, an independent 
judiciary, and the constitution.
18 Many scholars refer to those four basic formal 
institutions of capitalism as negative rights. Two major functions of negative rights are 
to reduce the discretionary power of state legislators and bureaucrats, and to protect 
individual rights and private ownership from a majority rule. 
 
Negative rights create specific and predictable behavioral incentives. By creating a 
strong marriage between the individual’s right to choose how to use a privately owned 
asset and bearing the costs (risk) of his/her choice, private property rights provide 
powerful incentives for the owner to invest time and effort in seeking the highest-valued 
uses for the asset.
19 The freedom of contracts reduces the transaction costs of identifying 
the value of resources in alternative uses and enhances their transfer to more productive 
owners. An independent judiciary serves the function of protecting individual rights 
against the rest of the world.
20 The constitution protects the individual against majority 




                                                 
17 In order to have expected consequences, private property rights must be both stable and credible. 
18The Index of Economic Freedom published annually by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street 
Journal has a longer list of most important rules that define the free-market, private-property economy. 
19Frequently, we voluntarily allow other people to make choices for us. The transfer of decision making is 
voluntary, and thus it is consistent with incentives to seek the best use for our assets (buying stocks). 
20 Two major requirements for an independent judiciary say that judges must expect that their decisions 
be carried out, and that their jobs do not depend on legislators and/or bureaucrats. 
21Buchanan, J. (1993), Property as a Guarantor of Liberty, Edward Elgar, p.59  
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However, formal rules of capitalism have been observed to produce different outcomes 
in different cultures. North wrote: 
Many Latin American countries adopted the U.S. Constitution (with some 
modifications) in the nineteenth century, and many of the property rights laws of 
successful Western countries have been adopted by Third World countries. The 
results, however, are not similar to those in either the United States or other 
successful Western countries. Although the rules are the same, the enforcement 
mechanism, the way enforcement occurs, the norms of behavior, and the 
subjective models of the actors are not [the same].
22 
 
Given their behavioral incentives, the basic institutions of capitalism require a culture, 
let us call it the culture of individualism, that encourages individuals to pursue their 
private ends. Classical liberalism and methodological individualism
23 made major 
contributions to the development of the culture of individualism. They provided 
philosophical justification as well as methodological support for looking at the 
community as a voluntary association of individuals who, in the pursuit of their private 
ends, join and leave the community by free choice. The culture of individualism 
encourages the behavior based on the principles of self-interest, self-determination, self-
responsibility and free market competition. It is merit-oriented, rewards performance, 
encourages risk taking, and promotes entrepreneurship.
24 The free-market, private-
property economy is then not merely an alternative method for the allocation of 
resources but a way of life in which each and every individual bears the value 
consequences of his or her decisions. Buchanan summarized a key consequence of the 
private-property, free-market economy as follows:  
Economic performance can only be conceived in values, but how are those 
values determined? By prices, and prices emerge only in competitive markets. 
They have no meaning in a non-market context, where the choice-influenced 
opportunity costs are ignored.
 25   
                                                 
22North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, p. 101. 
23 Classical liberalism and methodological individualism are cornerstones of the free-market, private-
property economy. The former is about individual liberty, openness to new ideas and tolerance of all 
views. The latter says that decisions made by governments, parliaments, corporations, and other 
organizations are decisions made by individuals. Individuals perceive ideas, invest time and effort in 
persuading others to accept their proposals, and bear the costs of failure. Hence, only the individual could 
be the unit of analysis.  
24As an example of performance being rewarded, in 1991, the median income of Asian-Americans 
($36,784), whose culture instills a strong work ethic, exceeded the median income of white Americans 
($31,435). See “Two Measures of Household Income,” New York Times, July 24, 1992, p. A10.  
25Buchanan, J., (1976), “General Implications of Subjectivism in Economics,” Paper presented at The 
Conference on Subjectivism in Economics, Dallas, Texas, December 1976.  
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INFORMAL RULES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND 
TRANSACTION COSTS SPECIFIC TO THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION 
 
The prevailing culture in C&EE is not homogenous. However, it has some common 
traits. The community is seen as an organic whole with its own common good to which 
members are expected to subordinate their private ends. It means that the prevailing 
culture in C&EE has a bias toward collectivism, egalitarianism, emphasis on extended 
family, and shared values.
26 While the culture of individualism puts a premium on 
performance, risk taking and the freedom to choose, the old ethos in C&EE favors the 
equality of results and social welfare programs. In many parts of the region, gains from 
trade are seen as a redistribution of income rather than as rewards to innovators for 
creating new wealth. State authorities are more likely to impose price controls on 
producers and/or merchants who earn large profits than to seek ways to create 
incentives for others to emulate such individuals in competitive markets. 
 
During four decades of socialism (seven in the former USSR), the old culture of C&EE 
served the people of the region well. By subverting the rule law to the will of the ruling 
elite, socialism weakened people's confidence in enforcement mechanisms (i.e., the 
judiciary and police). Yet, with its emphasis on the extended family and shared values, 
the culture of C&EE created a powerful fortress within which people were able to hide 
and to go on with their lives.
27 Unfortunately, by creating a survival path for East 
Europeans, the culture of the region had a major unintended consequence of 
strengthening the collectivism and shared values in C&EE. 
 
In general, the cultural heritage of C&EE supports an activist (paternalistic) state. An 
implication is that is the early 1990s East Europeans were not ready to embrace a way 
of life based on the principles of self-interest, self-determination, self-responsibility and 
free market competition. This, in turn, means that the acceptance, monitoring and 
enforcement of new formal rules in C&EE countries had to have positive transaction 
                                                 
26For more detailed analysis of the C&EE cultural heritage see Pejovich, S. (1993), “Institutions, 
Nationalism, and the Transition Process in Eastern Europe,” (E. Paul, Ed.) Social Philosophy and Policy: 
Liberalism and the Economic Order, Cambridge University Press, pp. 68-74. 
27Pekich, B. (1990), Godine Koje su Skakavci Pojeli (Years the Grasshoppers Ate), Belgrade.   
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costs. We can say that transaction costs specific to the process of transition arise from 
the conflict between the formal rules of capitalism and the prevailing culture of C&EE.  
 
Differences in the history and development of C&EE countries have created cultural 
differences among them. While classical liberalism, which is only a part of the Western 
tradition, has no deep roots in C&EE, countries that used to belong to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire have memories of the Western tradition of individual rights and the 
rule of law. It is primarily through the Catholic Church that Western tradition has 
influenced the development of informal institutions in Poland. Germany, Sweden and 
Finland have influenced customs and tradition in the Baltic States. Turkish and 
Byzantine cultures have left their imprints in the Balkans. Greek culture reflects the 
knowledge-creating consequences of maritime trading. Russian Orthodox Church 
remained a servant of the state from the days of Ivan the Terrible. Thus, it failed to be 
an independent source of informal rules. 
 
Numerous historical myths have created a strong marriage between ethnicity, and 
nationalism in many C&EE countries.
28 By feeding on the conviction that the 
community's common good transcends the private ends of its members, nationalism in 
many C&EE countries has reinforced the culture of collectivism. While strengthening 
the bond within ethnic groups, nationalism has raised the costs of interactions with 
outsiders. The Serbs in Croatia, the Albanians in Serbia, the Turks in Bulgaria, and the 
Hungarians in Romania are examples of how the marriage of ethnicity and nationalism 
creates spontaneous cultural autonomies. 
 
The greater is the conflict between the formal institutions of capitalism and the 
prevailing culture in a country, the larger are that country’s transaction costs of 
transition. Thus, to achieve the same transition results (e.g., the same ranking in the 
Index of Economic Freedom) a tradition-driven Montenegro would have to use more 
resources than a pro-western country like the Czech Republic. We can say that the 
                                                 
28Nationalism should not be confused with patriotism. The latter means attachment to a community and 
its institutions. Patriotism is then fully compatible with a voluntary association of diverse individuals who 
choose to live together. 
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cultural differences between Central and East European countries create differences in 
their respective transaction costs of transition.
29  
 
Historical development and nationalism of C&EE explain why the culture of 
collectivism and egalitarianism is stronger the farther east and southeast one travels. 
The interaction thesis then suggests that the transaction costs of transition in C&EE 
should be higher the farther east and southeast one travels. And if so, those differences 
in transaction cost should explain (and predict) differences in the results of transition 
from socialism to free-market, private-property economies. Indeed, and with only one 
exception (Croatia), 2003 Index of Economic Freedom ranks C&EE countries with 
more of a Western tradition as free or mostly free, while Russia and countries that used 
to be dominated by Russia and Ottoman Turks rank as mostly unfree and repressed.  
 
Given initial differences in the transaction costs of transition, the actual results of 
institutional restructuring in C&EE must then depend on the ability of individual 
countries in the region to reduce transaction costs arising from the interaction between 
the formal institutions of capitalism and their respective cultures. It follows that analysis 
must identify some critical factors capable of affecting the initial transaction costs of 
transition. The former nomenklatura and the forty-something group are two such 
factors.  
 
By exploiting the prevailing culture in C&EE, the old establishment and the forty-
something group have kept the transaction costs of transition from falling. In most 
C&EE countries, the old ruling elite, which includes party leaders, members of security 
services, upper level bureaucrats, managers of business firms, fellow travelers, etc., 
quickly did an about-face and began paying lip service to the transition to capitalism.
 
However, the old elite has a strong comparative advantage in economic policies that 
favor a state-centered economy, the collectivist mode of looking at the world, and 
promotions based on loyalty rather than merit. While paying lip service to competitive 
markets, purely a façade of words, the old ruling elite has done its best to subvert the 
                                                 
29Cardinal measurements of transaction costs are still in a pioneering stage. References to the differences 
in transaction costs are in terms of more or less.  
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transition from socialism to capitalism.
30 The fact that de-communization didn’t happen 
in most C&EE countries has then raised the transaction costs of transition in the 
region.
31 Since the early 1990s, the political landscape of C&EE has produced very few 
leaders like Klaus and Maar, and too many like Meciar, Yeltsin, Kravchuk and 
Lukasenko.  
 
The forty-something group is another factor responsible for high costs of transition in 
C&EE. This group’s package of benefits consists of assets specific to a socialist state, 
such as job security, allowances for children, medical benefits, liberal pensions, low 
cost vacations, and subsidized housing. Members of this group fear that the remainder 
of their working life is not long enough to allow them to replace those benefits with 
private saving and investments. It is important to understand that they didn't purchase 
tat package of assets by choice. However, it is all they got. Thus, members of the forty-
something group in many C&EE countries have been voting against free-market parties 
not because they prefer socialism to capitalism but for reasons of self-interest.
32  
 
                                                 
30Pejovich, S. (1993), “Institutions, Nationalism, and the Transition Process in Eastern Europe,” pp.73-74. 
31Some decommunization did occur in Germany. In a few countries such as the Czech Republic, former 
top leaders and members of secret services were to be excluded from decision-making jobs in 
government. Otherwise, it is fair to say that in C&EE the old elite retained its position of influence.  
32 Evidence is consistent with this proposition. Young people, who have made no investments in the 
assets specific to the old system, tend to support pro-reform parties, while members of the forty-
something group can be seen carrying pictures of Lenin, Stalin, Milosevich and other communist leaders.  
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THE CHOICE OF TRANSITION PROCESS 
 
The transition of former socialist countries into private-property, free-market economies 
requires that some basic institutions of capitalism--private property rights, the law of 
contracts, an independent judiciary, and a constitution--be introduced by fiat. Sunstein 
wrote: “For Eastern Europe in general, the drafting of a constitution [begins] the process 
of creating a legal culture with firm judicial protection of individual rights…prominent 
among them property ownership and freedom of contract.”
33  
 
The interaction thesis suggests that new formal rules might create behavioral incentives 
that are not in tune with the prevailing culture. The resulting conflict between new 
formal rules and the prevailing culture would, in turn, increase the transaction costs of 
contracting, maintaining and enforcing new formal rules. The results of transition in 
C&EE countries must then depend on policies their leaders decide to pursue in 
resolving the conflict between new formal rules and the prevailing informal rules.  
 
Belarus has failed to go beyond the initial promise of transition. “Its legal system does 
not fully protect private property, and the inefficient court system does not consistently 
enforce contracts…[for example] Belarus passed a law enabling the government to 
nationalize the property of any individual or business deemed to be damaging the 
state.”
34 Depending on the their respective prevailing informal rules and the bargaining 
strength of those opposed to transition, most countries in C&EE have proceeded with 
the process of institutional restructuring either by fiat or voluntary contracts or, most 
likely, a mix of those two methods. Let us now discuss those choices with reference to a 
specific country, say, Montenegro. 
 
The Transition by Fiat. The government of Montenegro could take an active role in 
the process of transition by enacting “clarifying” laws and regulations. The purpose of 
those laws (employment policy, investment subsidies, laws protecting culture, etc) 
would be to reduce the conflict between new formal institutions and the prevailing 
                                                 
33 Sunstein, C. (1993), “On Property and Constitutionalism,” Cardozo Law Review 14, p. 918. 
34 2003 Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, p.102.  
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culture.
35 Sunstein identified the costs of those secondary or modifying laws in C&EE 
as follows: “Without strong constitutional provisions on behalf of property rights, civil 
society, and markets, there will probably be a substantial temptation to intrude on all 
these institutions, and, by so doing, recreate the very problems that such institutions are 
supposed to solve.”
36  Then he added, ”…the case for a firm negative constitution, and 
for creation and protection [emphasis mine] of property rights and free markets, is very 
strong in Eastern Europe.”
37  
 
The old nomenklatura and the forty-something group have incentives to argue that a 
well-functioning market cannot be expected to arise “naturally.”
38 The outcome of their 
support for an activist state depends on their relative bargaining strengths in the 
community. But once they manage to get the government into the economy, rent-
seeking coalitions are going to emerge and use the state to obtain favorable regulations. 
Stigler wrote:  
The state is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society. With 
its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does 
selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries.
39 
 
The transition by fiat means that Montenegrins would end up with a government-
engineered compromise between capitalism and the old system. The costs of transition 
would be borne by all citizens regardless of whether they wanted institutional reforms, 
opposed them, or didn’t care one way or another. Moreover, the new institutional 
structure would do little to increase people’s confidence in the stability and credibility 
of private property rights and contractual freedom.  
 
                                                 
35 This approach to transition derives its support from the mainstream neoclassical economics, which 
focuses on outcome-oriented changes in a world without institutions.  
36 Sunstein, C. Op. Cit., p. 935. 
37 Ibid. 
38 The proponents of the German social market economy advanced this type of argument back in the 
1950s. 
39Stigler, G. (1971), “The Theory of Government Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics 2, p. 3.  
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The Transition by Voluntary Contracts. Alternatively, the government could try to 
assure Montenegrins that private property rights, the law of contracts, an independent 
judiciary and the constitution are stable and credible rules of the game. That would 
clearly be not an easy job for new leaders in the region in which the rule of law is, at 
best, a distant memory. However, let us suppose that the government is willing and able 
to leave Montenegrins alone to resolve, via voluntary interactions (contracts), the 
conflict between new formal rules and their culture.
40  
  
The transition by voluntary contract means that the agent of the process of change is the 
individual. The enactment of private property rights, the law of contract, an independent 
judiciary and a constitution create for individuals new, and fully legal, opportunities to 
pursue their private ends. Some individuals will choose to take the risk of exploiting 
those opportunities for personal gain. However, if the new opportunities for human 
interactions were not in tune with the prevailing culture in Montenegro, a conflict would 
arise between the individuals trying to exploit them and the community at large. In 
practice, such conflicts have surfaced in many different forms in C&EE. People have 
said that individuals seeking new contractual arrangements are foreigners “who want to 
take our money abroad,” or women “who should be staying at home,” or enterprising 
men “who want to profit at other people’s expense,” or Baptist missionaries “who want 
to destroy our Orthodox faith.”  
 
The behavior of the “pathfinders” would be below the margin of prevailing ethical 
standards in Montenegro. However, it is critical to recognize that they bear the costs of 
their activities. In addition to financial losses, those costs could range from losing 
friends to losing jobs and alienation from the community. However, if pursuing 
submarginal contractual activities (which, as noted, are fully legal) provided the 
pathfinders with a differential return, their success would create incentives for others to 
engage in the same or similar activities. And if the returns from those activities 
continued to be sustainable more and more individuals would find it in their self-interest 
 
                                                 
40 We can associate the transition by voluntary contracts with new institutional economics, Austrian 
economics and Public Choice.   
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to join in. Eventually, spontaneous pressures arising from within the system would 
slowly compel the community to embrace those submarginal activities.  
 
At that point, the transition by voluntary contracts would have reduced the conflict 
between the formal institutions of capitalism and the prevailing culture in Montenegro. 
The transaction costs of changing informal rules would have been borne by individuals 
whose expected benefits from changes in informal rules exceeded their costs of 
overcoming the community’s resistance. The result of transition would then be a 
sustainable voluntary compromise between the free-market, private-property economy 
and the old culture. The people of Montenegro would get no more and no less 
capitalism then they are willing to support. Moreover, they would be able to continue 
voluntarily adjusting the mix of capitalism and their old culture in the future. To 
accomplish the transition by voluntary contracts, the government of Montenegro has to 
enforce negative rights, leave people alone to work out the conflicts of interest via 
voluntary interactions, and institutionalize (repeated) exchanges that have passed the 
market test. 
 
Buchanan captured the essence of the difference between the two methods of 
institutional restructuring as follows:  
An activist state [is] ever ready to intervene when existing rights to property are 
challenged, ever willing to grasp the nettle and define rights anew, which once 
defined, immediately become vulnerable to still further challenges. [In a passive 
state] there is an explicit prejudice in favor of previously existing rights, not 
because this structure possesses some intrinsic ethical attributes, and not 
because change itself is undesirable, but for the much more elementary reason 
that only such a prejudice offers incentives for the emergence of voluntary 
negotiated settlements among the [individual members of the community].
41 
 
Given the region’s prevailing culture of collectivism, welfarism, and egalitarianism, 
new leaders have incentives to erode the transition by voluntary contracts. Indeed, we 
observe different mixes of the transition by voluntary contracts and the transition by 
                                                 
41Buchanan, J. (1972), “Politics, Property, and the Law,” Journal of Law and Economics 15, pp. 451-452.  
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fiat. The ranking of C&EE countries in 2003 Index of Economic Freedom is a good 
yardstick for evaluating the prevalence of one or the other mode of transition. For 
example, the Index shows that institutional restructuring in Estonia has been close to the 
transition by contracts, while institutional changes in Serbia and Montenegro have been 
close to the transition by fiat.  
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THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION: SOME 
EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
The scenario outlined above suggests that the transition by fiat and the transition by 
voluntary contracts are two major methods for carrying out institutional restructuring. 
Let us now look at several observations that illustrate the role of culture in the 
integration of new formal institutions into the social life. 
 
1. Niksicka Pivara (The Brewery of Niksich) in Montenegro is known all over Europe 
for its excellent beer. The firm won quite a few prizes in tough European competition. 
While the firm sold beer all over the former Yugoslavia and many European countries, 
its main profit came from summer sales along the coast of Montenegro.  
 
The end of socialism in the early 1990s led to privatization of many enterprises 
including the Brewery of Niksich. A foreign investor bought 70% interest in the 
brewery. The buyer paid 16 million German Marks in cash and promised to invest 
another 25 million German marks in the firm. The employees and local citizens kept 
30% interest in the brewery. In addition, foreign investor promised that the average real 
salary paid to the employees will not fall below the average real salary in the brewery at 
the time it was purchased. The average salary in real terms was 200 German marks per 
month. In those uncertain political and economic times in the Balkans, German mark 
served as the measure of value.  
 
New owners kept their contractual promise and invested more than 25 million German 
marks in the brewery. Yet, after decades of socialism, private ownership was out of tune 
with the prevailing culture in Montenegro. The employees discovered that shirking, 
tardiness, and long coffee breaks were out and working discipline in. Former managers 
and some employees lost a number of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits 
characteristic of property rights in socialism such as using company’s trucks for private 
business, frequent trips abroad, cheap credits, and subsidized housing. Local officials 
lost gifts and patronage.  
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The first strike occurred over the salary issue. Ignoring differences between the 
exchange rate controlled by the state and the real value of dinar (Montenegro currency 
at that time), the local union asked the firm to raise the average salary to 600 German 
marks. The management said no. From then until 2002, strikes, strike threats, and labor 
disputes continued to plague the brewery.  In May 2002, just as the tourist season was to 
begin, the employees demanded, through their local union, a big salary increase of 35%. 
At that time, the average pay in the brewery was equal to 400 Euro per month, while the 
average monthly pay in Montenegro was about 200.  In addition to higher pay, the 
employees also wanted the firm to buy a car for the union office, to give a share of its 
profit to the union, to put representative of the employees on the board of directors, to 
provide opportunities for the employees to travel abroad at company’s expenses, and to 
earmark a large amount of the firm’s revenue to build subsidized apartments for 
workers.  
 
By the fall of 2002, new owners had enough and decided to move the brewery out of 
Montenegro. The response from the striking employees and local politicians was quick 
and reflected their “understanding” of the right of ownership. They said that new 
owners didn’t build the factory and, therefore, they have no right to close it down. 
Eventually, workers and management arrived at some sort of compromise and the 
brewery is still in Niksich. However, this story is not an inquiry into the terms of 
collective bargaining in Montenegro. The message of the story is that the enactment of 
private property rights does not instantaneously create a neoclassical equilibrium. 
Different cultures require different expenditures of time, efforts and resources to bridge 
the gap between the enactment of private property rights and their eventual acceptance 
by the prevailing informal rules. To gain the benefits associated with the behavioral 
incentives of private property rights, new leaders must manage to create reasonable 
expectations about the credibility and stability of ownership.     
 
2. In response to the acquiescence to their rule, the Romanovs (1613-1917) protected 
the Russian Orthodox Church from competition by other churches. Communists leaders 
abetted this protection by raising the cost of entry into the market for religion. The result 
was that the Russian Orthodox Church has come to consider itself the guardian of  
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Russian customs and traditions. When in the 1990s, many Protestant denominations 
found the market for religion in Russia receptive to their teachings, the Russian 
Orthodox Church lobbied the state to pass laws prohibiting (or at least seriously 
restricting) other churches from marketing their services. Otherwise, the Church argues, 
Russian culture will be westernized. Clearly, the Church wanted new leaders to pass a 
rule that would raise the transaction costs of voluntary changes in informal rules.  
 
3. The transition by voluntary contracts explains the development of property rights in 
the American West. Libecap analyzed the development of mineral laws in the western 
United States in the second half of the 19
th century. Noting that common law judges 
continuously adjust rules to changes in the game he wrote: 
[As] the mining industry boomed, spurred by huge ore discoveries…pressure on 
existing legal institutions forced new ownership structure to emerge. This 
resulted in the observed progression in mineral rights law from general, 
unwritten rules [emphasis mine] in the 1850s to highly specified statutes and 
court verdicts by the end of the century.
42 
 
4. Some decades ago, the growth of output coupled with an increase in the range of 
durable consumer goods changed the opportunity costs of being a homemaker in the 
United States. The-then prevailing rules expected men to specialize in earning incomes 
while women were expected to specialize in the efficient spending of that income and in 
raising children. Single women were socially marginalized. Wives went to work in 
order to pay some specific bills between pregnancies and after kids went to college. 
Predictably, the market treated women as a high-cost resource relative to men. Pressures 
from feminist groups to equalize money incomes of men and women by fiat (i.e., 
institutional adjustments by fiat) created additional problems because the competitive 
market for labor was not discriminating by sex; it was merely responding to the 
prevailing informal rules. The real issue was then to change informal rules so that the 
competitive market for labor would have no reason to threat women as a high cost 
resource relative to men. The pressure for change in the prevailing informal rules came 
                                                 
42 Libecap, G. (1996), “Economic Variables and the Development of the Law; The Case of Western 
Mineral Rights,” (L. Alston, T. Eggertsson, and D. North, eds.), Empirical Studies in Institutional 
Change, Cambridge University Press, p.57.  
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from within the system (i.e., institutional adjustments by voluntary contracts) and was 
borne by career oriented women. Eventually, the country accepted the Pill, single 
motherhood, live-in arrangements and other norms of behavior that were submarginal 
not long ago but have now freed women from economic and social dependence on men. 
Posner had the following to say about the costs of changes in the sexual and 
reproductive freedom of women: 
The more reproductive autonomy and sexual freedom women have, the less 
interest men have in marriage, because secure paternity is one of the principal 
benefits of marriage for a man…Women who would prefer to specialize in 
household rather than market production are therefore harmed by sexual 
freedom, while women who prefer specializing in market production are helped 
by anything that gives them fuller control over their reproduction, though they 
too pay a price in reduced marital opportunities.
43 
 
5. In a recent study, Allison and Angeles demonstrated how the prevailing culture 
explains the difference in the way Americans and Europeans react to income 
inequalities.
44 They quote a survey showing that 71 percent of Americans and only 40 
percent of Europeans believe that the poor could do better via individual effort. 
Therefore, Allison and Angeles said, it is not surprising that the alleviation of poverty in 
the United States emphasizes work effort, while European governments prefer 
redistributive policies from above. Allison and Angeles wrote: 
…in their attempt to improve the fairness of economic outcomes, Europeans 
choose more redistribution and more government intervention which, in 
equilibrium, distorts market allocations and makes economic outcomes unfair… 
Interestingly, the biggest differences in redistributive policies between the 
United States and continental Europe reside in the support for poverty per se. 
That is, if you are sick, old or disabled, have dependent children, or have 
suffered an accident at work, you do get substantial support in the United 
States; but if you are merely poor, you do not get much support in the United 
States.(pp. 32-33) 
                                                 
43 Posner, R. (1995), Overcoming Law, Harvard University Press, p.183. 
44 Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G. (2002), “Fairness and Redistribution: US vs. Europe,” National Bureau 
for Economic Research, Working Paper 9502.  
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PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED FIRMS VS NEVER-PRIVATIZED 
ENTERPRISES 
 
Winiecki, Benecek, Laki, and many other scholars have been arguing that privatization 
policies that favor the development of new private enterprises (i.e. entrepreneurship) 
relative to the privatization of state-owned firms are likely to produce consequences 
similar to those of the transition by voluntary contracts.
45 Why? 
Suppose that the prevailing culture in Montenegro is in a serious conflict with the 
formal institutions of capitalism, or that the old ruling elite has managed to retain 
significant powers, or that the forty-five plus group supports pro-socialist parties, or all 
of above. The resulting transaction costs of institutional restructuring would reduce the 
costs of forming effective rent seeking coalitions. Former business managers and the 
employees of state-owned firms would have incentives to negotiate with the legislators 
and bureaucrats a favorable method of privatization. Indeed, many C&EE countries 
have adopted privatization schemes that can be easily characterized as stealing.
46  
 
On the other hand, the transition by contracts encourages the development of small, 
owner-managed, firms. The economic efficiency of entrepreneurs arises from the 
marriage between the right to capture the benefits of their decisions and bearing the 
costs of those decisions. The entrepreneur-owner is a person who perceives an 
opportunity, accepts the risk of exploiting it, and has the perseverance to follow through 
an idea. Thus, the entrepreneur-owner is a major dynamic force in the economy.
47 By 
lowering the costs of entry into business as well as the subsequent costs of taxation and 
regulation, a market-friendly process of transition creates incentives for new firms to 
emerge. A corollary is that governmental subsidies to entrepreneurs create inefficiencies 
                                                 
45 Benacek, V. (2002), “The Czech Generic Private Sector in Transition: Developments and Their Impact 
on National Economy,” unpublished manuscript;  Laki, M. (2002), “The Performance of Newly 
Established Private Firms: The Case of Hungary,” unpublished manuscript; Winiecki, J. (2002), “The 
New Entrepreneurial Private Sector in Transition and Economic Performance,” unpublished manuscript; 
Winiecki, J. (2002),”The Polish Generic Private Sector in Transition: Development and Characteristics,” 
unpublished manuscript 
46Milovanovich, M. (2002), “Endogenous Corruption in Privatized Companies”, unpublished manuscript. 
47Laki compared the performance of two groups of Hungarian managers in the 1990s. The first group 
consisted of individuals who managed business firms before the end of socialism. The other group 
included individuals who became managers of their own firms after the transition started. The 
performance of the second group was by far superior. Laki, M. (2002), “The Performance of Newly 
Established Private Firms: The Case of Hungary,” unpublished manuscript.  
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by encouraging patronage, bribes, false reporting and blackmail. In nutshell, the 
allocation of subsidies being a political decision, subsidies have to increase the 
transaction costs of allocating resources to the highest-valued users.
48  
 
Improving economic performance is not the most critical role the entrepreneur plays in 
the transition process. The essential contribution the entrepreneur makes to the 
transition process lies in bringing closer the culture of capitalism and the prevailing 
culture in C&EE countries. Entrepreneurs can and do accomplish this purpose because 
private-enterprises are the breeding ground for a work ethic, a capitalist  exchange 
culture, and a way of life that rewards performance, promote individual liberties, and 
places high value on self-responsibility and self-determination.  
 
                                                 
48The argument that subsidies (or low interest loans) are OK because they have to be paid back is a bunk. 
Entrepreneurs who fail are not likely to pay back anything. That is, the costs of their failure are borne by a 
third party. For example, the government of Serbia recently announced a loan from the World Bank to 
“help” small private firms. The assumptions that the government is capable of identifying the most 
productive users at a lower cost than competitive markets can do, and that the government would use such 




The paper started with a simple proposition that observed differences in the results of 
transition among C&EE countries are not accidental. It argues that transition is a 
cultural problem. The interaction thesis says that the conflict between formal institutions 
of capitalism and prevailing informal rules in C&EE countries explains differences in 
the results of transition. However, the actual results of transition depend on the way new 
leaders choose to deal with the factors affecting the transaction costs of transition. 
Analysis and empirical evidence suggest that the transition by voluntary contracts 
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